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Abstract
Catastrophic risk raises questions that are not only of practical impor-
tance, but also of great philosophical interest, such as how to define
catastrophe and what distinguishes catastrophic outcomes from non-
catastrophic ones. Catastrophic risk also raises questions about how to
rationally respond to such risks. How to rationally respond arguably
partly depends on the severity of the uncertainty, for instance, whether
quantitative probabilistic information is available, or whether only com-
parative likelihood information is available, or neither type of informa-
tion. Finally, catastrophic risk raises important ethical questions about
what to do when catastrophe avoidance conflicts with equity promotion.
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1 Introduction
The 2010 Kaprun train accident killed 155 people, making it Austria’s deadli-
est ever traffic accident. The country observed two days of national mourning,
and the regional governor referred to the accident as a “catastrophe”.1 That
same year, there were 552 road traffic fatalities in Austria.2 Few would call
that a catastrophe; on the contrary, the steady decrease in annual road traffic
fatalities had been seen as cause for celebration.
Why is it that 155 people dying in a train accident is a catastrophe, while
more than three times as many people dying in road traffic accidents in one
year is not a catastrophe? Is it worse, from a moral or social point of view,
that 155 people die in one accident, rather than, say, 155 people dying in one
hundred accidents spread over four months? And should society respond
differently to a risk that is expected to kill some number of people in multiple
incidents spread over the next four months, say, than to a risk that is expected
to kill the same number of people in one incident some time during the next
four months?
This article will discuss the above and some further philosophical ques-
tions concerning the treatment of catastrophic risk. For instance, I shall
consider whether catastrophic risk either permits or requires us to violate
principles of rationality that we are required to satisfy in more ordinary
choice situations. Moreover, I shall discuss tradeoffs between increased eq-
uity and reduced catastrophic risk. But first, I discuss different ways in which
1The governor was cited in a BBC story about the accident: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/europe/3502265.stm.
2The figures are taken from https://www.statista.com/statistics/437842/
number-of-road-deaths-in-austria/.
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“catastrophe” and “catastrophic risk” have been defined.
2 Defining “catastrophe”
2.1 Risk and catastrophic risk
A risk, as I shall be using the term, is a (greater than zero) probability3 of
an undesirable outcome, that is, an outcome that is by the relevant decision-
maker considered to be worse than the status quo. To put it slightly more
formally: I shall be thinking of a risk as a pair, consisting of a positive
probability and an undesirable outcome.
Both the probability and the potential undesirable outcome may be either
known or unknown. For instance, playing Russian roulette with one out of
six chambers loaded imposes a risk where both the probability (1/6) and the
potential undesirable outcome (death) are known. Smoking, on the other
hand, comes with a risk where the potential undesirable outcome is known
(lung cancer) but the exact probability for each individual is not known (even
though one can make pretty good predictions, even at the individual level,
based on statistical data). Finally, geo-engineering, and radically new tech-
nologies, may bring with them risks where both the probabilities and the
potential undesirable outcomes are unknown.
A catastrophic risk, as I shall use the term, is simply a (greater than zero)
probability of a catastrophic outcome. Sometimes an outcome is only catas-
trophic for some individual. For instance, a toddler’s death would (typically)
3A “probability” is a real number between zero and one, that satisfies the following
additivity property: if A and B are mutually incompatible, then the probability of A or B
obtaining is the probability of A obtaining plus the probability of B obtaining.
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be a catastrophe for its parent. From a social point of view, however, a single
child’s death would (typically) not be a catastrophe. Other outcomes are
catastrophic for a country, or some region. For instance, the Kaprun disas-
ter was, we can assume, a catastrophe for Austria, or at least for the state
of Salzburg. But 155 deaths in a train accident is not a global catastrophe.
The Spanish flu, on the other hand, which is thought to have killed 50 to
100 million people around the world, could reasonably be called a global
catastrophe.
2.2 Catastrophe and utility threshold
Do different catastrophes, and different types of catastrophes, have anything
in common that we could use to define the term, “catastrophe”, more pre-
cisely? One very natural idea, employed by Peterson (2002a), is to first
construct a measure of the desirability of various outcomes, according to
the agent of interest,4 and then define a catastrophe as any outcome that is
assigned a lower value than some threshold, by this measure of desirability.
To make this idea more precise, suppose that ui is a utility measure, that
represents how (un)desirable agent i considers different outcomes. For in-
stance, ui(o) = m means that agent i considers outcome o (un)desirable to
degree m. We can formulate the the simplest definition of “catastrophe” that
Peterson considers as follows:5
Definition (Peterson on catastrophe). For each utility function, ui, there is some
4Note that the “agent” could be a group, or a society, which is then assumed to have a
collective preference that can be represented by some measure of desirability (i.e., a utility
function).
5The slightly more complex definitions that he considers concern distances from either
the highest utility that is possible in a choice situation or the highest expected utility on offer.
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value n, such that an outcome o is catastrophic, according to i, just in case ui(c) ≤ n.6
This definition shares some similarities with a definition used by some
economists, where a catastrophe is defined as an event that takes consumption
below some threshold, or reduces consumption by some particular magnitude
(see e.g. Martin and Pindyck 2015).
How does this way of defining “catastrophe” handle the opening example
of this article? Consider for instance the comparison between on the one hand
155 deaths in a single train crash and, on the other hand, 155 deaths (or more)
from one hundred road traffic accidents spread over four months. Assuming
that the train crash is a (local) catastrophe, we could set the threshold utility,
n, such that the train crash is assigned a utility lower than n (according to, say,
the utility function of the Austrian “social planner”). In contrast, I surmise
that each individual road traffic accident is not, from the societal perspec-
tive, considered a catastrophe. But what does the definition imply for the
collection of 155 deaths from multiple traffic accidents? That would depend
on whether we count these deaths as a single outcome (since “catastrophic”
defined relative to an outcome).7
Suppose, for instance, that a decision to increase the speed limit results
in additional 155 deaths from road traffic accidents over four months. Then
we might view the 155 deaths as a catastrophe, even though the individual
deaths are not viewed as catastrophes. And then we should, given Peterson’s
definition, select a utility function that assigns this collection of deaths from
6Instead of defining catastrophe relative to some threshold utility, we could define it
relative to some threshold outcome, which would be more apt when a quantitative utility
measure is not available.
7I am grateful to Martin Peterson for a very helpful discussion of this point.
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road traffic accidents a utility below n even though no individual death is
assigned a utility below u. In contrast, if the 155 deaths are not the result
of any single policy intervention, for instance, then it might be more natural
to view them as multiple different outcomes. In sum, what counts as a
catastrophe, on this view, depends on how we individuate outcomes.
Moreover, suppose that we, as a society, have decided to treat catastrophic
risks categorically differently from other risks.8 Then by the above reasoning,
it would follow from Peterson’s definition that whether we should respond
differently to a risk that is expected to kill say 155 people in multiple incidents
than to a risk that is expected to kill the same number of people in one incident,
depends on whether we conceive of the former as a risk of a single outcome
or as a risk of multiple outcomes.
Another implication of the above way of defining “catastrophe”, is that
an expected utility maximiser is not, in any significant sense, sensitive to
catastrophic risk. An expected utility maximiser is someone who, when
confronted with a set of alternatives,9 always chooses the alternative with
greatest expected utility (or one of the alternatives with the greatest expected
utility if more than one alternative come out on top). Assuming that the
probabilities with which the available alternatives result in different outcomes
are known (an assumption that I shall later relax), the expected utility of
alternative Ai can be defined as follows.10 Let O = {o1, ..., on} be the set of
possible outcomes, and suppose that alternative Ai results in outcome o j with
8 To take an example, we might decide to maximise expected utility when managing
mundane risks while using some more cautious decision rule (such as one of the cautious
rules discussed in section 3) when managing catastrophic risks.
9Throughout this article, I will refer to the objects of choice as “alternatives”.
10The most commonly used version of expected utility theory with known probabilities
was developed by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944).
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probability pi, j. Then the expected utility of Ai is:
EU(Ai) =
n∑
j
u(o j) · pi, j
In other words, the expected utility of an alternative is a probability
weighted average of the utilities of the alternative’s possible outcomes.
It should be evident that the above equation leaves no room for a special
treatment of catastrophes, as defined above. When comparing two alterna-
tives, the only thing that matters, according to an expected utility maximiser,
is the alternatives’ expected utility. Therefore, the fact that an alternative
could result in an outcome whose utility falls below some threshold has no
bearing on whether or not it should be chosen, except in so far as it affects the
alternative’s expected utility. For instance, the fact that an alternative might
result in some particular catastrophe does not mean that it will not be chosen,
as long as either the catastrophe is sufficiently unlikely or the other outcomes
that the alternative might result in are sufficiently desirable.
Since many people think that rationality requires that we maximise ex-
pected utility—at least when the relevant utilities and probabilities are well-
defined and known—the above might suggest that aversion to catastrophic
risk is not rational.11 Even more worryingly, for those who think that catas-
trophic risk aversion can be rational, Peterson (2002a) proves that aversion
to catastrophe, defined as above, violates some principles that are strictly
weaker than the requirements of expected utility theory.
11The two most common justifications of expected utility maximisation are that, first,
an expected utility maximiser can expect to do better (by her own lights) in the long-run
than someone who is not an expected utility maximiser; and, second, that expected utility
maximisation is entailed by some purported principles (or axioms) of rational preference
(see, e.g., Briggs 2019).
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2.3 Catastrophe as concentration of fatalities
An alternative definition of catastrophe, that has become quite widespread in
theoretical economics and social choice theory, essentially assumes that the
decision-maker of interest is an expected utility maximiser. The definition
stems from Keeney’s (1980) seminal work on attitudes to risk, but it has
been extended by for instance Rheinberger and Treich (2017) and Bernard
et. al (2018).12 For the sake of simplicity, I shall focus on Keeney’s original
definition, but my remarks apply equally to the more recent generalisations.
Strictly speaking, the definition in question does not define “catastrophic”
as a category of outcomes, but rather as a category of risks. Informally,
the definition says that a small probability of a great number of fatalities is
more catastrophic than a greater probability of a smaller number of fatalities,
assuming that the expected number of fatalities from the two risks is the
same. For instance, a one in a million chance of one million deaths is more
catastrophic than one death for sure. If p and p′ denote two probability values,
k and k′ denote two quantities of fatalities, and (x, y) denotes an ordered pair
consisting of x and y, then Keeney’s definition can be more formally stated as
follows:
Definition (Keeney on catastrophic risk). Risk (p, k) is more catastrophic than
risk (p′, k′) if pk = p′k′ and k′ < k.
What does this definition imply for the opening example of this article,
for instance, how 155 deaths in a single train accident compare to 155 deaths
spread across one hundred road traffic accidents? As previously mentioned,
12Other recent work that uses Keeney’s or similar definitions include Bommier and Zuber
(2008), Fleurbaey (2010), Bovens and Fleurbaey (2012).
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the definition does not directly say anything about how to compare these
outcomes. However, it does tell us how to compare the risk from, say, road
traffic with the risk from train traffic. As an illustration, let’s make the (obvi-
ously false) assumption that we know for sure that exactly one person will die
each day in road traffic accidents and we know that there is an independent
1/155 chance each day there will be a fatal train accident (and, for the sake
of simplicity, let us assume that if there is a train accident then exactly 155
people will die). Then Keeney’s definition, and subsequent generalisations,
imply that the risk from road traffic is less catastrophic than the risk from
train traffic. And if society should be (or simply is) catastrophe averse, then it
should be more concerned with risks from train traffic than from road traffic.
One limitation of Keeney’s definition is the assumption of a fixed ex-
pectation of fatalities. However, this limitation is arguably justified given
Keeney’s aims, which was to try to isolate the effect that catastrophe aversion
has on the social preference. For if the expected number of fatalities differs
between two risks, then a preference for one over the other might be driven
by considerations about the expected number of fatalities.
Another apparent limitation of Keeney’s definition is that it only explicitly
concerns fatalities. This limitation is only apparent, however, as “fatality” can
be interpreted as the loss of any good. For instance, we could interpret k as
the number of insect species lost or as hectares of deforestation. In fact, for
Keeney’s definition to take into account the indirect effects of fatalities on the
population in which they occur, k would have to be interpreted very broadly,
possibly as broadly as total welfare loss. Some losses of lives, animals or
plants are more destabilising to, say, the social or natural order than other
9
losses. Such a destabilisation is often what makes a loss catastrophic (cf.
Bostro¨m and Milan C´irkovic´ 2008). Hence, for Keeney’s definition to be at all
plausible, “fatality” must not be understood too literally.
A more serious limitation of Keeney’s definition concerns the fact that it is
stated in terms of precise probabilities. Suppose that as a society, we have de-
cided that we should be particularly concerned with catastrophic risks, in that
we should treat them categorically differently from more mundane risks (see
fn. 8). Now, we cannot use the definition in question to determine whether
risks such as those imposed by artificial intelligence and geo-engineering—
risks that are typically classified as “catastrophic”—are catastrophic or not,
since in those cases we lack knowledge of precise probabilities. So, the deci-
sion to give a special significance to catastrophic risk, coupled with Keeney’s
definition, has no implications for how we should respond to what we would
typically consider to be catastrophic risks.
2.4 Catastrophe and discontinuity
Yet another suggested definition of “catastrophe” requires some sort of discon-
tinuity between catastrophic and non-catastrophic outcomes. Posner (2004:
6), for instance, defines catastrophe as an outcome13 that, if it obtains, “will
produce a harm so great and sudden as to seem discontinuous with the flow
of events that preceded it.” Note that the previous two definitions do not re-
13Strictly speaking, Posner defines catastrophe as a particular type of event. In decision
theory, “events” are typically understood as collections of “states of the world” that are
outside of an agent’s control, whereas “outcomes” are taken to be the results of an agent’s
acts and are thus at least partly under her control. (I thank a reviewer for encouraging me to
clarify this.) Given this terminology, a catastrophe could be either an outcome or event, but
I shall typically be using the term “outcome”.
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quires such discontinuity. For instance, on Peterson’s definition, there could
be an outcome whose utility is exactly n, which means that it is catastrophic
but would no longer be catastrophic if it were improved even to just the
slightest possible degree. Similarly, on Keeney’s definition, a single poten-
tial fatality might determine how two risks compare in terms of the “more
catastrophic than” relation. For instance, even if (p, k) is more catastrophic
than (p′, k′), (p, k) might not be more catastrophic than (p′′, k′′) which only
differs from (p′, k′) by a single potential fatality. So, given Peterson’s and
Keeney’s definitions, catastrophic outcomes need not be discontinuous with
non-catastrophic outcomes.
How does Posner’s definition of “catastrophe” handle the opening exam-
ple of this article? Arguably, the Kaprun train accident was, for Austrians,
“discontinuous with the flow of events that preceded it”, unlike both each
of the individual road traffic accident and the collection of road traffic acci-
dents that resulted in 155 fatalities. Hence, on Posner’s definition, the Kaprun
train accident might count as a catastrophe while equally many fatalities from
several road traffic accidents would not count as a catastrophe. Thus catas-
trophe averse societies should be willing to do more to prevent events like
the Kaprun train accident than to prevent a number of separate road traffic
accidents that together would result in an even greater number of fatalities.
It is worth noting that if catastrophic outcomes really are, in some im-
portant sense, discontinuous from more normal outcomes, then it might be
rational to employ some method other than expected utility theory to decide
how to choose when faced with catastrophic risk. After all, the expected
utility formula, as defined above, makes no room for such discontinuity. For
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instance, no matter how disastrous an outcome would be, an expected utility
maximiser is willing to risk ending up with that outcome for the sake of a
sufficiently high chance at some outcome that is only marginally better than
the status quo.
I shall not in this article take a stand on which of the above (or indeed any
other) definition of “catastrophe” is most useful, natural, or correct. Instead,
I shall now turn my attention to the different types of situations in which one
might be confronted with catastrophic risk, and the different questions that
these situations raise about how to respond to such risk.
3 Different levels of uncertainty
In the last section it was assumed that the catastrophes had well-defined and
known probabilities.14 In what follows, I shall refer to such catastrophic risk
as quantitative catastrophic risk. Sometimes, we find ourselves in situations
where although we may not know the probability of a catastrophe, we may
know how the probability of a catastrophe compares with the probabilities
of various other possible outcomes. I call such catastrophic risk qualitative
catastrophic risk. At other times, we do not even know such comparative
probabilities, but are merely aware of the possibility of some catastrophe. But
unfortunately, we are sometimes not even aware of some possible catastrophe.
Clearly, quantitative catastrophic risk entails qualitative catastrophic risk
which entails awareness of catastrophic risk. Another way to think of this
14In other words, it was assumed that the decisions in question are what economists
typically call decisions under risk. Since we often talk about risks in ordinary language (and
in disciplines other than economics) when the probabilities are unknown, and perhaps even
undefined, I shall not follow the economists’ convention.
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categorisation is in terms of the severity of the uncertainty: the uncertainty
is most severe when we are not even aware of the catastrophic risk, less
severe when we know the comparative probabilities, and even less severe
when we know the quantitative probabilities. The appropriate response to
a catastrophic risk may depend on the severity of the uncertainty, as the
following subsections illustrate.15
3.1 Quantitative catastrophic risk
The probability that an asteroid will collide with earth can be calculated with
good confidence. For all practical purposes, we can treat such a probability
as a well-defined and objective probability; roughly, a quantity that, were we
to come to know it, we should let it guide our subjective probabilities (cf.
Lewis 1980). So, the catastrophic risk imposed by an asteroid is what I call a
“quantitative catastrophic risk”.
Since the probability of an asteroid colliding with earth is known, standard
expected utility theory, as described above, should be applicable to situations
where we are trying to decide how to react to a possible collision. However,
quantitative catastrophic risk raises some questions that might put pressure
on expected utility theory.
One question we can ask about quantitative catastrophic risk is whether
we should, when confronted with such risk, accept the type of continuity that
expected utility theory entails. For instance, suppose that we are considering
increasing the global GDP by 0.1%, which we prefer to the current status
15Some argue that the rational response to any risk (not only catastrophic risk) partly
depends on the severity of uncertainty about the risk. See e.g. Binmore (2009), Gilboa et al.
(2009), and Stefa´nsson and Bradley (2019).
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quo. But now imagine that we learn that doing so brings with it increased
risk of human extinction. The continuity that expected utility theory implies
ensures that there is some probability p such that we should be willing to start
a project that has a probability p of increasing global GDP by 0.1% without
human extinction, but also has a probability 1 − p of human extinction.
Some may find the above implication of continuity to be hard to accept.
However, it should be kept in mind that we all regularly make choices that
bring with them some small increases in the risk of our own death for the sake
of achieving moderately desirable outcomes. For instance, we might cross
the road to pick up a $10 bill we dropped, even if there is some risk that we
will be run over by a car in the process.
Another question we can ask about quantitative catastrophic risk is whether
the linearity assumption of expected utility theory should be accepted when
faced with such risk. This linearity assumption for instance implies that de-
creasing catastrophic risk by 0.01 is always equally valuable, irrespective of
the original level of risk. For instance, reducing the risk of a catastrophe from
0.01 to 0 is exactly as valuable as reducing the risk from 0.51 to 0.5.16 But one
might wonder whether that is really the case, in particular, when faced with
potential catastrophes (Stefa´nsson 2020).
Finally, we might ask whether de minimis cutoffs are ever justified when
confronted with quantitative catastrophic risk.17 According to standard prac-
16Here is an illustration. To simplify, we can assume that the outcome that obtains if
the catastrophe is avoided is assigned a utility 0 (but the claim in no way depends on this
assumption). And let’s consider some particular catastrophe, C, that has some (negative)
utility, u(C). Then the expected utility of reducing the risk of this catastrophe from 0.51 to
0.5 is (0.5 − 0.51)u(C) = −0.01u(C), which is the same as the the expected utility of reducing
the risk of this catastrophe from 0.01 to 0, (0 − 0.01)u(C) = −0.01u(C). (Note that as u(C) is
negative, −0.01u(C) is positive.)
17This question can also be asked about qualitative catastrophic risk, where de minimis
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tice in policy and law, risks that are deemed deminimis, that is, trivial or minor,
are either ignored or treated qualitatively differently than other risks (for dis-
cussions, see e.g. Mumpower 1986, Peterson 2002b, Adler 2007). Although it
might seem obvious that ideally rational and informed agent’s would never
employ such cutoffs, it could be argued that it would be reasonable for ac-
tual agents to do so, since it might significantly reduce the cost and time of
deliberation.
However, if there is no limit to how bad a catastrophe can be, as e.g.
Weitzman (2009) assumes, then the reasonableness of de minimis cutoffs could
be questioned in situations of catastrophic risk.18 Moreover, even if the bad-
ness of catastrophes is limited, one might wonder whether de minimis cutoffs
can be coherently applied by ordinary agents who lack perfect information,
recall and foreknowledge. For instance, even though the risk imposed by
each chemical in a set of chemicals is de minimis, the risk imposed by the
set might not be de minimis. So, a regulator who applies de minimis when
considering which chemicals to allow, might end up ignoring the risks from
a set of chemicals even though together the chemicals consistute a risk that is
not de minimis. More generally, limited agents who apply de minimis cutoffs
will over time take greater risks than they would upon reflection want to take
(Lundgren and Stefa´nsson 2020).
would be defined relative to some threshold outcome rather than some quantity.
18Broome (2013: S30) however points out that this assumption seems questionable in light
of the fact that “We are a finite species living on a finite planet”.
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3.2 Qualitative catastrophic risk
Global greenhouse gas emissions impose catastrophic risks that arguably
are qualitative. Wagner and Weitzman (2015), for instance, claim that there
is at least a 10% chance of global warming having catastrophic social and
economic consequences. The risk is thus qualitative, in that we know that
the probability of a climate catastrophe is at least as great as the probability
of randomly drawing a yellow ball from an urn containing nine red balls and
one yellow ball.
Sometimes when faced with qualitative risks, we can use sets of probabili-
ties, rather than a single probability, to represent our uncertainty. For instance,
if the probability of a climate catastrophe is at least 10% but no greater than
20%, then we can represent our uncertainty by a set of probability functions
that assign from 0.1 to 0.2 probability to a climate catastrophe. In that case,
we might want to use the Maxmin expected utility rule (Gilboa and Schmidler
1989), which selects an alternative whose minimum expected utility (relative
to all the probability functions in the set that represents our uncertainty) is
no lower than other available alternatives’ minimum expected utility. Alter-
natively, since the Maxmin expected utility rule is arguably too cautions, we
might instead use an “optimism/pessimism” weighted Maxmin expected util-
ity rule, which weighs each alternative’s maximum and minimum expected
utility by a factor that reflects the decision-makers optimism/pessimism (see
e.g. Binmore 2009).
Note that the above two rules are generalisations of the standard expected
utility rule, since they yield the standard rule when the decision-maker only
considers one probability function. But situations of qualitative catastrophic
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risk might tempt us to use modes of reasoning that depart in more radical
ways from expected utility maximisation. For instance, we might ask whether
we should employ some version of the Precautionary Principle, which its
proponents generally present as a genuine alternative to the rule to maximise
expected utility. Although there is no real consensus about how to interpret
the principle, it is generally agreed that it implies that in situations of “sci-
entific uncertainty” special precaution should be taken if our actions could
result in a catastrophe.19
We might also, in situations of qualitative catastrophic risk, consider post-
poning making a decision until we get better evidence. Now, one might
wonder whether postponing isn’t just tantamount to choosing one of the
available alternatives, in which case postponing should not be seen as an al-
ternative to the decision-rules discussed above.20 However, one can also see
postponing as a meta-decision, that is, one can see it not as a result of a de-
liberation about a decision-problem after one has formulated it, but rather as
a decision to wait with formulating the decision problem until further infor-
mation becomes available. Finally, if postponing is too costly (or impossible),
then we might consider attaching value to flexibility, which might then result
in choosing an alternative that is sufficiently flexible such that we can make
the optimal choice if further evidence becomes available.21
The questions discussed in the last two paragraphs might also arise when
we find ourselves in situations where we are aware of a potential catastrophe
but neither have quantitative nor qualitative probabilities, which is the type
19For a discussion, see e.g. Steele (2006), Peterson (2006), Aven (2010, 2011) Steel (2014),
Stefa´nsson (2019).
20I thank a referee for pressing me on this.
21Bradley and Steele (2015) discuss some of the issues raised in this paragraph.
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of situation to which I turn next.
3.3 (Un)awareness of catastrophic risk
The existential risk posed to humanity by artificial intelligence is arguably a
catastrophic risk that we are aware of but for which we lack both quantitative
and qualitative probabilities. Although experts are often willing to guess the
probability of human extinction due to AI, they would readily accept that
their guess is nothing more than that, and one might doubt the prudence
of basing one’s decisions on the exact quantities or comparisons from such
guesses.
When one is “merely” aware of catastrophic risk, without knowing ei-
ther the quantitative or qualitative probabilities, it can be particularly hard
to decide what to do. But amongst the principles and strategies that we
might consider, is to use the (deterministic) Maxmin rule, which chooses an
alternative whose worst possible outcome is no worse than the other alterna-
tives’ worst possible outcomes. Alternatively, we might try to postpone the
decision until more information becomes available, or choose an alternative
that is sufficiently flexible such that an optimal choice can be made if more
information becomes available.
The arguably most unfortunate situations, are those where one is not
even aware of some potential catastrophe. Situations of unawareness can be
distinguished depending on whether the decision-maker realises that there
might be some important (perhaps catastrophic) possible outcome that she
is unaware of—which is often called conscious unawareness—or whether she
is even “unaware of her unawareness”. The latter type of situation raises no
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interesting questions about rational choice: If a person is unaware that her
choice might result in some catastrophe, and doesn’t even suspect that she is
unaware, then it would seem meaningless to ask how she should respond to
the potential catastrophe.22 However, one might ask whether the person was
rationally permitted to be so unaware—but that is a question about rational
belief, not rational choice.
In contrast, conscious unawareness, or “awareness of unawareness”, raises
some interesting but difficult questions about rational choice. I think it is fair
to say that there is no consensus as to how an agent should rationally choose
in situations of conscious unawareness. But the literature on conscious un-
awareness, and unawareness more generally, is rapidly growing.23
4 Catastrophe avoidance vs. equity promotion
Before concluding this article, I shall briefly discuss tradeoffs that may arise
between on one hand promoting equality and on the other hand reducing
catastrophic risk. Let’s first consider the goal of promoting outcome equality,
or ex post equality as it is often called. Suppose that we are in a choice
situation where the relevant outcomes are that two individuals, Ann and
Bob, either live or die. Further, suppose that Ann and Bob are the only two
doctors in a remote village that would have great difficulties in attracting new
doctors. Now imagine that we have a choice between two risky alternatives:
22Here I am assuming the subjective (rather than objective) sense of “should” that is
typically of interest to those working on rational choice and risk.
23See, for instance, Bradley (2017), for a recent discussion of unawareness and rational
choice. Steele and Stefa´nsson (ta) are a new book-length philosophical treatment of un-
awareness. Schipper maintains a bibliography on unawareness at http://faculty.econ.
ucdavis.edu/faculty/schipper/unaw.htm.
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If we choose alternative A, then either only Ann dies (with probability 0.5) or
only Bob dies (also with probability 0.5), but if we choose alternative B, then
either both Ann and Bob die (with probability 0.5) or neither dies (also with
probability 0.5). This choice situation is represented by table 1.
p = 0.5 p = 0.5
A Only Ann dies Only Bob dies
B Ann and Bob die Nobody dies
Table 1: Catastrophe avoidance vs. ex post equality
To the extent that we are motivated to promote outcome equality, we
might be tempted to choose B, where Ann and Bob share the same fate, over
A, where they don’t share the same fate. However, it is easy to imagine that B
is catastrophic whereas A is not: While only Ann (or only Bob) dying would
be merely tragic, it would be catastrophic (for the village) if both doctors die.
And, indeed, according to Keeney’s definition, B is more catastrophic than A:
Both alternatives have an expected fatality rate of one, but B has a 0.5 chance
of two fatalities wheres A will result in only one person dying. So, in this
case, there is a tradeoff between outcome equality and catastrophe avoidance
(for a discussion, see e.g. Bovens and Fleurbaey 2012).
Let’s now turn our attention to the goal of promoting equality in the dis-
tribution of chances, or ex ante equality (or risk equity) as it is often called.
And imagine now that we have a choice between two slightly different alter-
natives: If we choose C, then Ann will die for sure; but if we choose D, then
Ann and Bob each have an independent 0.5 risk of dying. (That they have
an independent risk of dying means that, say, the probability that Ann dies,
given that Bob dies, is the same as the probability that Ann dies give that Bob
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survives.) This choice situation is represented by table 2.
p = 0.25 p = 0.25 p = 0.25 p = 0.25
C Only Ann dies Only Ann dies Only Ann dies Only Ann dies
D Ann and Bob die Only Ann dies Only Bob dies Nobody dies
Table 2: Catastrophe avoidance vs. ex ante equality
To the extent that we are motivated by ex ante equality, we might be
tempted to choose D rather than C, since D distributes the fatality risk equally
amongst Ann and Bob, whereasC imposes all the risk on Ann only. But again,
by assumption, D is catastrophic whereas C is not. And, indeed, by Keeney’s
definition, D is more catastrophic than C, since both have an expected fatality
rate of one but D has a 0.25 chance of resulting in two fatalities whereas C will
result in only one fatality. So, in this case, there is a tradeoff between ex ante
equality and catastrophe avoidance (Keeney 1980 is an influential discussion
of this type of tradeoff).
5 Concluding remarks
We have seen that catastrophic risk raises several deep and difficult philo-
sophical questions. For instance, it is far from obvious how “catastrophe”
should be defined, nor why (or indeed whether) catastrophic outcomes dif-
fer qualitatively from non-catastrophic outcomes. Catastrophic risk moreover
raises questions about how to rationally respond, and might be seen as putting
pressure on traditional expected utility theory. Finally, catastrophic risk raises
hard questions about what to do when the goal to reduce catastrophic risk
conflicts with the goal of promoting equality.
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